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What is the Question? 
Review essay on Mike Savage et al (2015) Social Class in the 21st Century, Pelican 
Books 
Reviewed by Andrew Sayer 
 
I imagine that readers of Soundings, like others who have a strong interest in politics 
and culture, will often think of British society in terms of the ‘working class’ and 
‘middle class’, and perhaps the ‘upper class’ too. Indeed, for many of us, this is not 
merely a habit of thought; it reflects a strongly politicised attachment to such ways of 
thinking. And the wider British public is thoroughly familiar with this model too, 
even though many people consider class an outmoded concept. 
 
So a book which tells us that there are now 7 classes, not 3, and in particular that there 
is no clear boundary between the working and middle classes, is likely to cause a stir. 
This is what Social Class in the 21st Century claims, and it’s well worth reading – 
consistently interesting and accessibly written. It summarizes a major study by a team 
of sociologists led by Mike Savage of LSE, based on a major online survey run by the 
BBC (‘The Great British Class Survey’), plus a smaller but more representative social 
survey, and a set of 50 interviews with people across a range of occupations. 
Unusually for social research, with the aid of the BBC’s backing, the study received 
considerable publicity and reaction, even beyond the UK. The reactions were very 
mixed, even from the BBC itself; while some found the results intuitively plausible, 
many were bemused, uncomprehending and dismissive, and there was the usual 
undertow of British anti-intellectualism and suspicion of social research. 
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The aim of the study was to find out how best to group or classify people according to 
differences in their economic, cultural and social characteristics – to reveal groups 
‘who share common lifestyles, identities, social networks and political orientations as 
well as levels of income and wealth’. 
 
Older definitions of class, not only Marxist definitions (which were trying to explain 
something different), but also sociological classifications based on occupation, 
produce categories that increasingly fail to match up with individuals’ income and 
wealth, lifestyle and life chances. Knowing that someone is dependent on a wage or is 
a manager doesn’t reveal much about these things. In particular, neither sociologists 
nor the general public seem to be able to identify a clear boundary between the 
working class and the middle class. But as this book argues, this does not mean that 
class has lost its importance; on the contrary, it has not disappeared but changed 
shape. 
 
Like many researchers in recent years, they draw upon the work of the late French 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. This adopts a 3-dimensional approach to class in place of 
the old one-dimensional occupational models. Bourdieu’s particular interest was not 
primarily the economic influences on class but the cultural and social dimensions, the 
often-subtle ways that people classify themselves and others through their actions and 
ideas, creating hierarchies of worth. In short, individuals’ class is based on not only 
on their economic capital (income and wealth, including housing), but cultural capital 
(tastes and interests, particularly familiarity with cultural goods valued by the 
dominant), and social capital (social networks, connections and ties). He called them 
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capital because they bring their holders advantages vis-à-vis others. The concept of 
cultural capital is particularly useful for understanding inequality and ‘soft power’ in 
society – the advantages associated with an easy, confident familiarity with the 
cultural activities and goods associated with those at the top, and an ability to talk 
knowledgeably about them, can serve as a badge of membership in elite circles, 
provoking feelings of superiority and inferiority among people with more or less of 
such capital. Those at the bottom certainly do not lack culture, but they lack cultural 
capital because their cultural activities do not bring them advantages relative to others 
- on the contrary. 
 
Having one kind of capital may help you get more of another – the cultural 
knowledge and tastes that play well in elite circles may allow you to increase your 
social capital, in turn helping you get a better paid job; but the three kinds of capital 
can also vary independently of one another. Crucially, this makes it possible to 
register that those who have similar amounts of economic capital – perhaps managers 
in the private sector and certain professionals in the public sector – may have different 
kinds of cultural and social capital, and thus different lifestyles, values and 
dispositions, and probably different political beliefs. The other distinctive feature of 
the approach is that it allows us to acknowledge gradations between classes; it 
doesn’t impose sharp boundaries where there are gradual transitions.  
 
For Bourdieu, everyday social life is pervaded by largely unacknowledged 
competitions and struggles: competitions for valued goods, positions, experiences and 
activities; competitions and disagreements over what is of value – what counts as 
cultural capital, for example?; and competitions over whose views on what is of value 
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have authority. Someone from the traditional working class might value football 
above the theatre, but in an unequal society, her judgements are unlikely to count as 
much as those of the theatre-lover. There is no neutral standpoint outside this field of 
competition over value, and the playing field is far from level. So in trying to measure 
cultural capital, researchers face difficult choices over what to include. As Bourdieu 
observed, the meaning of class is part of what these struggles are about. 
 
By getting information on individuals and indicators of their economic, social and 
cultural capital, the researchers were able to identify common clusters of these 
capitals that differentiate groups of people from others. The seven classes they found 
were: 
- an ‘elite’, the top 6% in terms of income and cultural and social capital;  
- an established middle class, with moderate economic, cultural and social 
capital;  
- a technical middle class, reasonably well off but having very limited social 
capital; 
- new affluent workers, reasonably well off but reporting only limited cultural 
engagements; 
- a traditional working class with limited economic, social and cultural capital, 
though having more than the precariat; 
- emerging service workers, with limited economic capital but moderate cultural 
capital; 
- the precariat, in low paid and insecure work and supported by benefits, with 
little or no savings. 
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Though the lists runs from the most to the least advantaged in terms of economic 
capital, when one takes into account cultural and social capital too, it is not a simple 
hierarchy; for example, ‘the new affluent workers’ might be placed above the 
technical middle class. By far the most clearly distinguished from their adjacent 
classes are those at the extremes – the elite and the precariat - while the five classes in 
the middle shade into one another more, though there are nevertheless significant 
differences between their typical members. The elite’s mean income of £89k is almost 
double that of the next highest class, and their house prices and savings far exceed 
those of the rest. The precariat as defined here is more restricted than in Guy 
Standing’s usage1, for it excludes those from more advantaged positions who happen 
to be in insecure employment. They have not only little economic capital or security, 
but very little cultural or social capital. They are also stigmatized - and are acutely 
aware of it.  
 
In arriving at this classification it was found that in addition to traditional, highbrow 
cultural capital, a new kind of cultural capital is emerging. This is characterized by 
familiarity with a range of genres, from classical to pop, from skiing to football, and 
by confidence in moving between. ‘Cultural omnivores’ benefit from this, but 
significantly, it is largely the preserve of more educated people, and far from levelling 
class differences, it seems to be creating new ones. 
 
The 7 classes differ in other ways. Given that it takes time to accumulate capital, 
especially economic capital, the elite and established middle class tend to be older and 
the emerging service class younger, though the traditional working class is also 
relatively old. Ethnic minorities straddle the traditional working/middle class divide: 
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they are under-represented in the elite, but well represented in the established middle 
class and the emerging service workers, as well as in the precariat; many had more 
cultural capital (particularly educational qualifications) than economic capital. 
Although the book notes the persistence of gender inequalities it says little about how 
these relate to the 7 classes. Girls and women do better in education than boys and yet 
are quickly overtaken by men in earnings in the job market, so presumably one would 
expect men and women to be represented unequally across the classes. Is not our 
economic and social capital affected profoundly by whether we are male or female, 
single or coupled or divorced? And how does the structure of households affect 
individuals’ class position? As for the geography of the 7 classes, while the elite are 
heavily localised in the London and the South-East, there is otherwise no simple 
north-south divide but a much more messy picture, in which urban-rural differences 
stand out, not just in economic capital, but in social and cultural capital. 
 
Social mobility is a major topic in the book. Strangely, Savage silent on downward 
mobility, even though unless the room at the top expands, upward mobility has to be 
matched by downward mobility. It rightly points out the dangers of the now popular 
concept of meritocracy, first highlighted by Michael Young, who coined the term as 
part of a critique. Yet Savage doesn’t quite question the origins of ‘merit’. Even aside 
from the limitations of concepts of intelligence, it misses how much intelligence and 
ability of many kinds are dependent on upbringing. Growing awareness of how plastic 
our brains are, particularly in our early years, implies that the unequal social 
influences that impinge on us from birth have a major effect on our abilities. 
Consequently, even if inequalities were to arise purely through some kind of fair 
competition today, the resulting advantages and disadvantages would be passed on to 
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the next generation, so that subsequent competition would no longer be fair. And 
while ‘achievement’ may indeed be an important feature of the elite class, this is 
arguably more a consequence of membership than a cause.  
 
There is a substantial and valuable chapter on higher education and class, with 
degrees playing an important role as part of cultural capital in class differentiation. 
The expansion of higher education in recent decades has not meant greater equality. 
Where you go to university matters hugely; their social composition varies 
systematically, with Oxbridge and a few London Universities far above the rest. Our 
universities are strikingly hierarchically ordered; a table locates them according to the 
economic and cultural capital of their graduates. What is sad about this situation is of 
course that people are liable to mistake capital for quality, the posh for the good, 
though the posh need not necessarily be good, and the good need not necessarily be 
posh. Even if students know this, they may realize that others will judge them 
according to how posh their university is rather than on the quality of their education. 
 
The book is not only about the objective characteristics of the members of the 7 
classes, but their subjective feelings about class and its associations. Here the book 
builds on a now major literature on the lived experience of class. Perhaps most 
interesting are the responses of those at the top and the bottom. The precariat were 
painfully aware of how they are (mis)read by others, and of how precisely those 
things being measured in the study – economic capital and cultural goods and values 
– were loaded against them. This loading wasn’t the product of bias in the study, but a 
reflection of how they work in society. With the partial exception of those at the top, 
there is great ambivalence about class – both an acute awareness of class signals, and 
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embarrassment and reluctance to talk about it, for fear of being seen as snobbish. 
While this is not a new finding by any means, it’s important to see through the 
refusals of the concept of class that are so common in British society, by recognizing 
that they are more an expression of discomfort about class inequalities than a denial 
of their existence. 
 
There are many other interesting findings. One is that the participation in the online 
survey was dominated by those at or near the top, with scarcely any from the 
precariat; hence the need for an additional, more representative survey. It seems that 
the while those at the bottom are already all too aware of their position, it is mostly 
those at the top who are curious about class and who can approach the topic happily. 
Many of the interviews bear this out. Another is that in addition to the gender pay gap 
in occupations, there is also a clear class pay gap, particularly in high status 
occupations, so that among lawyers, or medics or bankers, those who enter them with 
the most capitals tend to get the highest paid jobs. 
  
It would be a shame if we found it impossible to think about class in any other way 
than a one-dimensional, 2 or 3 class model, at least if we’re interested in class in 
terms of different capacities, lifestyles and dispositions. It’s good to broaden out our 
assessment of economic inequalities beyond income to include wealth, particularly 
housing and savings, and in turn to go beyond economic to social and cultural 
inequalities, especially as the latter impact so deeply on the lived experience of 
inequality. As long as we’re talking about class in the GBCS team’s terms, as 
groupings of people with similar clusters of economic, social and cultural capital, then 
by and large, the conclusions stand. But all these forms of capital are outcomes of 
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processes and structures, many of which lie beyond the scope of the study, including 
structures that are the focus of other concepts of class. The problems start when they 
try to explain these outcomes, particularly where economic inequalities are 
concerned, and this takes us deeper into the politics of class.  
 
It’s here that we need concepts of class that deal with relations between people: buyer 
and seller, employer and employee, lender and borrower, landlord and tenant, carer 
and cared-for. Most of these are unequal in terms of power, and many allow one side 
to take advantage of this, free-riding on the efforts of the other. Nevertheless, social 
reality is far too messy for us to expect them to crystallise out into neat classes of the 
sociological kind, not least because the amounts of money acquired within them and 
work done can vary considerably – a small time employer may get less than a top 
employee of a big firm – but also because each of us is likely to enter into more than 
one of these relations. But notwithstanding the messiness of the quantitative outcomes 
in terms of money, the qualitative relations matter because they raise questions of 
economic justice: are they fair? Do they involve unwarranted free-riding on others’ 
labour? And what kind of effect do the economic practices have on people? 
 
The book mentions rentiers twice, though only in passing and without providing a 
definition or explanation of their significance. Rentiers are recipients of unearned 
income, gained through controlling existing scarce assets that others need or want, 
such as property and money, and who can be charged for their use. Rentiers get a free 
lunch: something for nothing - wealth extraction without wealth creation. Like any 
free lunch it is at the expense of others, and of more productive uses of resources. It’s 
both unjust and dysfunctional. Capital gains from rising property or share prices are 
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the classic example. The rise of neoliberalism has massively increased the size of 
rentier income, and it is particularly those at the top of the 1% who have made 
extraordinary gains through these means, enhancing their political power in the 
process. A parochial sociology that avoids getting into matters of economic relations 
misses this. In the terms of Bourdieu’s approach, £1k of earned income (dependent on 
contributing in some way to the production of goods and services) is no different from 
£1k of unearned income. But from the point of view of economic justice, the 
difference is huge. The politics of class is not only about stigma, and feelings of 
superiority and inferiority, guilt or shame, important though these surely are, or 
indeed of social mobility, but the injustice of the economic relations which give 
people such arbitrarily different amounts of income, wealth and power in the first 
place. 
 
One gets the impression that Savage has little time for such approaches to class. 
Extraordinarily, those that highlight exploitation are summarily dismissed as 
‘moralistic’. Much sociology has a strangely jaundiced yet contradictory view of 
ethical or moral judgement, dismissing it as merely ‘subjective’, or a matter of 
arbitrary conventions, while at the same time being rightfully concerned with the 
immorality and injustice of sexism, racism, homophobia and class contempt; there is a 
clear moral concern evident in the author’s own discussions of class stigma. But at the 
same time, with one word, serious reasoning about economic justice that can inform 
the politics of class is dismissed.   
 
Savage acknowledges the exceptional character of the top 1%, and as an object of 
concern, but he is insistent that we would do better to focus on the top 6%. He is 
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dismissive about reviving the concept of ‘The Establishment’. The reasoning behind 
this is peculiar. On the one hand, this larger elite, many of whose members benefitted 
from the post-war boom and the salaries and housing market that came out of it, is 
indeed distinct from those below, and should be acknowledged as such. On the other 
hand, he notes that those at the very top get access to rentier sources of income, and 
notes the ‘excessive rewards’ of the super-rich. Yet he argues that a focus on the 1% 
would be about particular “’super-wealthy’ individuals alone”. But of course, it need 
not: it could more usefully address the sources and uses of their economic capital.2 He 
also argues it would detract attention from the wider group they call the elite. But why 
should identifying these two groups be mutually exclusive? The numbers at the very 
top are small, to be sure, but their role in our current political economic system and its 
problems are huge. The hedge funder manager or the financial trader has far less in 
common with the rest of the elite than the elite has with the 6 classes below them. 
 
The best question I’ve ever seen about class, was this one, from the US sociologist, 
Erik Olin Wright: ‘if class is the answer, what’s the question?’ It’s the right one 
because many arguments about class are at cross-purposes; they’re actually between 
people who want to use the word for different purposes. A concept of class that tries 
to capture basic social relations of capitalism and a concept that tries to capture 
groupings of individuals with similar lifestyles and life chances are radically different 
things, so it’s peculiar to expect either to do the job of the other, or to use one as the 
basis for rejecting the other. Nevertheless, there’s a long history of sociologists, 
Marxists and others doing just that. And as capitalism has developed, the degree of 
correspondence between the division between labour and capital (central to Marxist 
approaches) and patterns of difference in lifestyles and life chances (central to 
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sociological approaches) has decreased. Further, with large numbers of dual earner 
households the relationship between individuals’ employment and their wealth 
becomes weaker. So it’s no surprise many people are not sure whether they are 
working class or middle class.  
 
I suspect that the habit of thinking about class in terms of a 3-class model will die 
hard, but I suggest Social Class in the 21st Century offers us a better picture of the net 
outcomes of the economic and cultural processes that produce inequalities in Britain 
today. Nevertheless it doesn’t take us back far into those processes and it largely 
avoids the issues of justice that need to be addressed in the politics of class. 
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